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ARTICLES
TOWARDS A CONCEPTION OF AUTHORIAL
KNOWLEDGE IN COPYRIGHT
LIOR ZEMER

t

I.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most intuitive reactions to the question what copyright is,
would probably be: "copyright is an expression of knowledge."
Contemporary copyright scholarship did not yet develop a sufficient
conception of authorial knowledge. Indeed, as Michael Birnhack recently
argued, it is crucial that we "have a conception of how knowledge is
created, otherwise [copyright law] is meaningless."'
The process of
creating copyrighted materials is a process of knowledge accumulation. In
Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property,2 the authors take
'knowledge' to represent the common ground that connect between the
different intellectual property regimes. They use 'knowledge' as a means to
define the making of patents and copyright and argue that "participants in
the Knowledge Society will be a challenge for both individuals and nations,
for it will require unprecedented levels of intellectual sophistication and a
highly advanced technological infrastructure. Social and business practices
must change as associations become more a matter of machine
interoperability than of human interaction., 3 Despite this, and the fact that
there exists a political agreement "on the power of technology and
innovation ' A to transform unstable economies to stable, knowledge-based
information societies, this process is dependent on human interaction and
on the consumability. This article argues that before we place technology
t Visiting Assistant Professor, Boston University, School of Law; Lecturer in Law,
University of Leicester, England. The ideas developed in this Article benefited greatly from
discussions and comments provided on earlier drafts of this Article by Leslie Green, Mary
Jane Mossman, and Carys Craig.
1Michael D. Bimhack, The Idea of Progressin Copyright Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP.
L. J. 58, (2001).
2 EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR

THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY ix (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
3

id.

4 Marja Hayrinen-Alestalo, Is Knowledge-Based Society a Relevant Strategy for Civil
Society?, 49 No. 4 CURRENT Soc. 203, 206 (2001).
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and innovation at the forefront of debates on intellectual property, we ought
to pay attention to the evolution of knowledge as the basic factor
responsible for the very act of producing technology and advancing
innovation.
This article argues that the intellectual property community should
emphasize the role of human interaction and the social nature of knowledge
when debating the future of intellectual property laws.5 Excluding the
development of a solid conception of authorial knowledge from debates on
intellectual property will impose on us the inevitable cost of increasing
protection to copyrighted, patented, and trademarked goods "to the point
where access becomes limited, technological developments is retarded, and
the fruits of the Knowledge Society put out of reach." 6
This article presents a theory of authorial and artistic knowledge for
matters of copyright ownership. It presents a socio-legal approach to
authorial and artistic knowledge and creativity. Michael Madison recently
remarked that we ought to ask ourselves "where does creativity come from?
How do 'creative' works of authorship come about? We care about the
copyright system because we care about the answers to these questions, yet
the questions are rarely asked in a formal way in connection with copyright
debates." 7 This article attempts to show that answers to Madisons'
questions require the development of a solid conception of authorial
knowledge. I shall argue that knowledge and the flexibility of the mind to
create copyrighted works, which involve a certain degree of creativity, are
social entities and owe much to social and cultural interactions.
As a way to access these arguments, Parts II and III of this article
develop a conception of authorial knowledge and authorial creativity. Since
this article argues that a socio-legal approach to authorial knowledge does
not mean the end of copyright or the "death of the author," Part IV explores
the role of the individual creator in the making of copyrighted entities and
justifies limited private rights for authors and artists. Part V takes the limits
of an author's creative ability as a test case and explores the distinction
between the conservative and realist approaches to creativity. Finally, Part
VI concludes the discussion and claims that in order to strike the
appropriate balance between private and public in copyright law,
contemporary copyright affairs must remain attentive to the very idea
behind the sociality of authorial and artistic knowledge.

5See Bimhack, supra note 1.
6 DREYFUSS ET AL., supra note 2, at xii.
7 Michael J. Madison, Comment: Where Does Creativity Come From? And Other
Stories of Copyright, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 747, 759-60 (2003).
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II.
AUTHORIAL KNOWLEDGE
(1) Principles
Arguments advocating the sociality of knowledge are not novel.8
Their impact on the allocation of rights in copyright is. Modem copyright
laws consider works of art and authorship as expressions of new authorial,
artistic or musical knowledge, almost arguing that the creation of
copyrighted works does not necessitate a priori knowledge. Manifestations
of authorial knowledge, however, are socially and culturally constructed.
They are not created from thin air and are products of social interaction and
collective cultural collaborations. 9 Excluding arguments on the sociality of
knowledge from contemporary debates on copyright, adds to the growing
gap between perceived benefits and social costs.
Although the social nature of knowledge is yet to play any significant
role in debates on the balance between private and public in copyright or to
have a solid impact on the evolution of conceptions of ownership and title
in intellectual property, intellectual property laws consider knowledge a key
element in intellectual property protection. For example, patents require
familiarity with a specific field of technology and copyright assumes the
use of common ideas, concepts and facts that reside in the public domain.
Also, the international intellectual property community also recognizes
aboriginal rights under the heading of "traditional knowledge."' The mere
fact that intellectual property laws acknowledge the reliance on pre-existing
substances means that knowledge, scientific or artistic, is a social construct.
Its origin is in communal interchange."
8 In Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion John Stuart Mill argument is based on
the fallibility of human knowers. Sanders Peirce emphasizes the fallibility of individual
knowers and provides a definition of truth with an emphasis on the community inquirers.
They both agree on the frailty of individual human knowers. See JOHN STUART MILL, Of the
Liberty of Thought and Discussion, in JOHN STUART MILL: ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS
20-61 (1991); JusTUs BUCHLER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PEIRCE: SELECTED WRITINGS (1940).
Philosophical arguments on the sociology of knowledge are fascinating and are
relevant to inquiries on copyright law. Longino summarizes the main arguments and deals
with Haack, Goldman, Kitcher, Hesse, Fuller and many others. She makes a distinction
between the different schools of thought and reaches conclusion who is more individualistic
and who is less so. See HELEN E. LONGINO, THE FATE OF KNOWLEDGE 42-68 (2002).
9 I further explore the collaboration between public and authors in Lior Zemer, The
Copyright Moment, 43(2) SAN DIEGO L. REV. (2006 (forthcoming)).
1o See e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples and
Community TraditionalKnowledge in InternationalLaw, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 275, 276
(2001).
11Language is one of the core elements that determine communal interchange. In that
respect, Gergen and Gergen write: "If we favor a constructionist view of social life, we are
immediately drawn to the importance of language. It is through language that we create the

BUFFALOINTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LA WJOURNAL

Vol 3:2

In Social Construction:A Reader Mary Gergen and Kenneth Gergen
provide ample support to the argument that knowledge is a social construct.
In the Introduction to the reader they write:
Perhaps the pivotal assumption around which the constructionist
dialogue revolve is that what we take to be knowledge of the world and
self finds its origins in communal interchange ... his view stands in
dramatic contrast to two of the most important intellectual and cultural
traditions of the West. First the tradition of the individual knower, the
rational, self directing, and knowledgeable agent of action is thrown
Second, the communal view of knowledge also
into question ....
represents a major challenge to the view of Truth, or the possibility that
more objective or accurate
any one arrangement of words is necessarily
12
in its depiction of reality than any other.
Gergen and Gergen then conclude that "[o]ur relationships give rise to
Our commonly shared
our understandings of the real and the good ....
assumptions of the real and the good serve as anchors for our daily
activities,"' 13 a reality which, for authors, composers and the like, include
the creation of copyrighted materials. A conception of knowledge is
required in order to fully understand the ways in which creators utilize
social relationships and share in the creative process.
(2) Shapin's Formula
Philosophers regard man, in contrast to other living organisms, as an
entity capable to possess a greater ability to create, to react, to think, to
store knowledge and to create more knowledge. Copyrighted works reflect
their makers' knowledge and abilities such as the creative ability and the
ability to internalize social and cultural external elements, then translate and
embody them in different ways. Every knowledge has history and every
new knowledge is fashioned and operates in a social context. That includes
authorial, artistic, and scientific knowledge.
In a most fascinating account Steven Shapin argues that we should
"take for granted that science is a historically situated and social activity
and that it is to be understood in relation to the contexts in which it
occurs." 14 From Galileo's observation of sunspots, Boyle's water pump,
Descartes' scheme for explaining reflex actions, to Kepler's temple of
astronomy and Hooke's microscopic magnification of the eyes of a
common fly, Shapin places revolutionary scientific products in their
historical-social context and claims that the task is "to display knowledge
sense of the real and the good, that we create our histories and our destinies." SOcIAL
CONSTRUCTION:
A READER 61(Mary Gergen & Kenneth J. Gergen eds., 2003).
2
1 1d. at2.
'" Id. at

34.

14 STEVEN SHAPIN, THE ScIENTiFIc REVOLUTION

9(1996).

Spring 2006

TOWARDS A CONCEPTION...

making and knowledge holding as socialprocesses., 15 He explains his idea
of what amounts to social processes. He gives the example of "the use of
metaphors from the economy in the development of scientific
knowledge."' 16 He then concludes that "there is as much 'society' inside the
scientist's laboratory, and internal
to the development of scientific
'' 7
knowledge, as there is 'outside.'
Shapin does not deny that science could not develop unless from time
to time it was shaken by revolutions, but he leaves us with the question of
how revolutionarycan a scientific revolution be?' 8 Any attempt to answer
this question necessitates redefining the scope of ownership rightholders
claim over their revolutionary products. Every revolution, this article
contends, is a social construct. Being socially constructed means that
contribution received from external sources should never confer private
exclusive ownership over this contribution.
(3) Longino's 'Three Senses of Knowledge'
(i) Knowledge as Knowledge Production
Knowledge can be defined under both objective and subjective
parameters. 19 The latter relates to the use of inner qualities, such as
common sense and reaction, in making judgments and inferences
concerning aspects of experience that matter to us. Authorial, artistic and
scientific investigations are a matter of extending the knowledge we have,
of testing new proposals, of sometimes overturning common sense, and
reacting by judging certain events according to experiences we had in the
past. There are differences between various groups of scientists in the ways
they define this causal connection. A useful formula is Helen Longino's
three senses of knowledge: 20 knowledge as knowledge production;
knowledge as knowing, and knowledge as content.
First, knowledge as knowledge production concerns how knowledge is
produced and can be best understood as a transformation of initial inputs
15 id.

16

id.

"7Id.at 10.

18After all, Ian Hacking remarks, "revolution sounds romantic." LAN HACKING, THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? 172 (1999).
19 The recognized division between subjective and objective knowledge has been
criticized by many commentators. Marjatta Maula, for example, argues that the division
"implies that explicit knowledge 'represents' external reality in an exact way . . . Our
personal knowledge ... is more or less influenced by our senses and earlier experiences and
knowledge . . . At its best, our knowledge approximates reality." Marjatta Maula, Three
Parallel Knowledge Processes, 7 KNOWLEDGE AND PROCESS MGT. 55, 55-56 (2000).
20 Longino applies these three senses to debates on scientific knowledge. Longino,
supra note 8, at 77-96, 135-40.
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into representational outputs. It is an issue of causality. Psychologists,
sociologists, philosophers and empiricists will approach this issue
differently. The common issue is ratifying some content as knowledge.
For example: the individual, for psychological and cognitive scientists, is
the main object and the question concerns internal representation, while:
Social scientists are concerned with representations that are the medium
of intellectual exchange, with public shareable, representations ....
The sociologist is intended in all the casual processes and interactions
involved in the formulation of a model or in the discovery or
construction of a hitherto unknown substance or process and in the
processes and interactions involved in its acceptance-rejection in a
community (footnote omitted).2'
(ii) Knowledge as Knowing and Knowledge as Content
The second sense is knowledge as knowing and concerns "knowledge
as a state of a person or persons with respect to some particular object or set
of objects.,,22 In this sense knowledge represents a three-term relation,
between: (i) a subject or subjects; (ii) a representation or some content; and
(iii) an object or objects. The third sense is knowledge as content, that is
knowledge of that which is known, the content or corpus of knowledge
without it being attributed to any particular individual (for example
historical knowledge and scientific or legal knowledge that piles up in
published materials).2 3
Translated into copyright terms, the creation process of copyrighted
entities neatly reflects Longino's three senses of knowledge. Since
authorial and artistic knowledge is created in a social context, creators first
internalize external social processes and events and then transform them
into representational outputs. They are normally required to know the
knowledge they use and be familiar with its content before communicating
it to the public. In fact, Longino argues that "at the very least, internal
representations have to be transformed into a medium that can be shared in
order to be put into play in a common discursive space. 24 This
transformative process requires constant social exposure and dialogic
practices. It requires interaction between the individual author or artist and
the wider community.

21 Id. at 78-79. Empiricists will concentrate on "processes of generating accounts and
and having those accepted by the community." Id. at 79.
representations
22

d. at 80.

23

Id. at 82-83.

24

1d. at 79.
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(4) The Role of Reasoning
Longino's argument on the three senses of knowledge is closely
related to the role of reasoning in knowledge production. Individual minds
can be defined as storehouses of pieces of information, experiences, social
or cultural events, that are sometimes engaged in calculating the place and
meaning of a certain event or given piece of information. Reasoning is not
mere calculation, it is a process of combining different kinds of information
25
and judging various considerations in the production of conclusions.
Copyright works are an example of this conclusion. They are the product
of a complex process that combines internalization of external experiences
and information from different sources, judging these on different grounds,
generating ideas and finally expressing them in a tangible medium.
Reason in copyright terms, then, has two senses. First is the
constructive sense according to which reasoning is a combination of ideas
and information that produces new ideas. The substance of the ideas varies
- while some ideas are value-laden, other ideas are value-constrained. The
fact that there exist different levels of value reflects the unavoidable
connection between personal views of the individual reasoner and the
information consumed from the community.
The second sense is the justificatory sense. If the constructive sense
of reasoning deals with the production of new ideas, the justificatory sense
of reasoning concerns combination of ideas and information to support
other ideas. The main issue of the second sense is not merely to generate
more ideas but rather to build on the first sense and establish sustainable
new ideas. In the second sense, the value is of great importance as once an
expressed idea has received public recognition it has probably been
recognized as having in itself some social, economic or other value. The
justificatory reasoning then can be understood as part of a practice of
challenge and response - challenge to a claim, societal need, personal need
or other need, and a response to that need by producing new ideas and
investing them in a new object. The need/response dichotomy is another
principle that shows the sociality of the creative act. It unveils the
dependence of the creative act on social relations.
(5) Implications
As a unitary entity, society constantly designs social standards
applicable to all communities. For example; that sexual intercourse
requires consent, that contaminating rivers with industrial chemicals is a
criminal offence under environmental laws, or that X is prohibited from
conducting excavations in Y's garden, or that X is held liable for violation
25

Id. at 103.
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of Y's property right if after having been authorized to conduct the
excavations, X enters Y's premises and copies the soundtrack Y composed
for a new film. A particular community, on the other hand, may impose
additional norms designed to its particular orientation, view or occupation.
The knowledge authors possess then, has been fashioned by (i) being
members of society (the public at large); and (ii) being a member of a more
defined community (lyricists, illustrators etc.).
This distinction between the wider public and special communities
brought some social epistemologists and sociologists of knowledge to claim
that individuals are subsumed by society or their special community and
that all they know is by virtue of their being members of society. Although
at first glance this interpretation seems problematic as it assumes that
individuals have no role to play in the formation of new knowledge, some
philosophers embrace this approach. For example, according to Lynn
Hankinson Nelson, X knows only what society knows.26 She argues that X
cannot know anything his community does not know because individuals
experience the external reality through socially shared categories.
However, Nelson's theory affects the very notion of individual autonomy
and raises questions that may inflict on the credibility of her argument: how
there can be exchange or growth of knowledge if we follow Nelson's
argument? Does not interaction between the individual and his community,
and between individuals and other individuals, produce new knowledge?
The basic difficulty in Nelson's argument is perhaps that she regards
'social' as 'shared' while it is to be understood as 'interaction.' 27 The
"interactive act" that individuals perform is what makes new knowledge
possible, creates "a new space of possibilities" to emerge, 28 ensures that
social diversity flourish, and triggers the initiation of contemporary socially
shared categories of norms and standards. At the same time, however, we
can draw some benefits from Nelson's theory. For example, her theory
supports the argument that the human mind does not store knowledge that is
not shaped by socially shared norms of categories, by certain standards
common to us all. These shared categories include social processes and
external events, ideas and other elements necessary for one's selfdevelopment. On this account, authors cannot produce works that are
totally new, not even in the sense of originating from the author. Their
Hankinson Nelson, Epistemological Communities, in FEMINIST
EPISTEMOLOGIES 121-60 (Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth Potter eds., 1993).
27 Longino, supra note 8, at 148. She writes: "Certainly, some assumptions and values
are shared in any community, but genuine interaction requires diversity among the members.
What identifies a given community as a community is not a set of shared substantive beliefs,
but a set of public standards to which community members appeal in critical discursive
interactions." Id.
28 See Hacking, supra note 18, at 172.
26Lynn
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participation in the creation of new knowledge by consuming substances
from socially shared categories is what makes their claim to property in
their copyrightable creations, to some degree, sound.
The contention that knowledge is social is likely to generate
objections revolving around the role of individuals and their relation to the
community in which they live. One may argue that "knowledge is social"
which denies the role of the individual and may cause insurmountable
difficulties with respect to wealth distribution and allocation of rights in a
society that is bound to secure economic incentives for authors, artists and
scientists and provide support for future creative productivity. Another
might argue that the immediate reaction to the contention knowledge is
social is that it makes individuals mere subjects of a system without a
satisfactory degree of personal autonomy. In the next parts I shall address
these objections and argue that the preservation of the individual's creative
autonomy is vital.
III.
AUTHORIAL CREATIVITY
The creative act is a variation upon knowledge. It is a knowledgebased activity and is at the forefront of many theories and research
proffered concerning the explicability of knowledge. If knowledge is a
social phenomenon and a basic component in the creative act, creativity is
ipso facto social. An analogy from a recent research on group creativity
explains this assertion. For that analogy, treat the public as a team and
authors as members of that team. Simon Taggar argues that group
creativity is not completely determined by individual creativity; rather,
group creativity emerges in a synergetic way when members of the group
interact in different ways.29 Individuals, this research suggests, can provide
only the raw material for novel and useful ideas but interaction can yield
group-level creativity. 30 A later research used Taggar's findings to view
"team creativity as the simple aggregate of individual creativity., 31 Jessica
Litman's view of Taggar's theory would probably go the opposite way.
Litman argues that the public domain only provides the raw materials. If
the public is a team of individuals who contribute mere raw materials,
products may either never change or the quality of their substance will
remain low. As opposed to Litman,32 the collective who maintains the
Simon Taggar, Individual Creativity and Group Ability to Utilize Individual
Creative Resources: A Multilevel Mode, 45 No. 2 ACADEMY OF MGT. J.315, (2002).
30 Id.
31 Andrew Pirola-Merlo & Leon Mann, The Relationship Between Individual
Creativity and Team Creativity:Aggregating Across People and Time, 25 J. OF ORG. BEHAV.
235, 239 (2004).
32 Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J.965 (1990).
29
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social and cultural realities where authors and artists create, is a crucial
contributor to the creation process of copyrighted materials. The team - the
public - is the source for the transformation of raw materials to social
products.
Research on creativity takes many different perspectives: creativity of
products, of arts, of science, of cognitive processes, the construction of
personality traits, the influence of hereditary and the environment, and
more. 33 A key question in debates on creativity is whether there is any
"truth in the stereotypes of the introverted and moody artist, or the absentminded yet brilliant professor? ' '34 The sociality of the creative act, the
dependence of authors and artists on social interactions and cultural
relations urges one to reply to this question with the negative. In The Rise
of the Creative Class, musicians, artists, scientists, teachers, and many other
professions are characterized as the most influential class in society. 5 Even
if most of us would like to associate ourselves with one or more of these
categories, most of us do not produce inventions that change the world,
paint revolutionary paintings, make momentous scientific discoveries or
write great novels or poetry that change the teaching itinerary in academic
English departments. Regardless of the creative content of our creations, no
one can claim for ones self the glory of creating in isolation from the social
environment, from consuming commonly owned and collectively produced
cultural and social symbols, from reshaping already-existing templates.
What, if anything, is there about the inner make-up of some
individuals that enables them to produce great works of art? 36 "What had to
be in place within our cognition initially, which either provided the
sufficient conditions for our greatly enhanced creativity to make its
33 See generally, CREATIVITY (John D Roslansky ed., 1970); CREATIVITY (Philip E.
Vernon ed., 1970); THE NATURE OF THE CREATIVITY: CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1987); MARGARET A. BODEN, THE CREATIVE MIND:
MYTHS AND MECHANISMS (1992); ROBERT W. WEISBERG, CREATIVITY: BEYOND THE MYTH

OF GENIUS, (1993); DIMENSIONS OF CREATIVITY (Margaret A. Boden, ed., 1994); THE
CREATIVE COGNITION APPROACH (Steven M. Smithet et al. eds., 1995); CREATIVITY IN

CONTEXT (Teresa M. Amabile ed., 1996); MIHALY CSIMSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW
AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY AND INVENTION (1996).
34 Uwe Wolfradt & Jean E. Pretz, Individual Differences in Creativity: Personality,
Story Writing, and Hobbies, 15 No. 4 EUR. J. OF PERSONALITY 297, 298 (2001).
35 RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS AND How ITISTRANSFORMING
WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2002).

36 Karl 0. G6tz & Karin G6tz, Personality Characteristics of Successful Artists, 49
PERCEPTUAL AND MOTOR SKILLS 919 (1979) (finding that research on artistic creativity also
inquiries into the difference between artists and scientist. For example, neuroticism was
found to be distinct to artists from scientist. Also finding that male artists were not only less
extraverted than non-artists but were also more neurotic). See also, James C. Kaufman, The
Sylvia Plath Effect: Mental Illness in Eminent Creative Writers, 35 J. OF CREATIVE BEHAV.
37 (2001) (finding that female poets exhibit significantly higher levels of psychology than
other poets, playwrights, journalists and fiction writers).
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appearance, or supplied the background against which some sort of
disposition to engage in creative activities could emerge or get selected
for?" 37 Normally, for copyright protection to exist a certain level of
intellectual effort is required. Then 'the
work might be identified as its
8
3
creation.
intellectual
"own
producer's
IV.
PRESERVING THE INDIVIDUAL'S AUTONOMY
(1) The Role of Personalityand Intelligence
Realization of one's own intellectual efforts is dependent on various
elements and capacities that take place in the creative act and shape creative
expressions. Intelligence and personality are the two elements that sit at the
heart of the creative process. In fact, as Alan Durham argues, originality is
39
sometimes claimed to "ensure the presence of the author's personality
and expressive forms of personality are reflective of the creator's
intelligence, and represent his "individuality, his personality, his
experiences, his self'40 and his knowledge.
First, copyrighted works manifest their creator's personality - an
infusion of his internal code to an external object. 4 1 The human personality
is a cluster of innate and adaptive faculties.4 2 The basic elements of the
37 Peter Carruthers, Human Creativity: Its Cognitive Basis, Its Evolution, and Its
Connections with ChildhoodPretence, 53 BRIT. J. FOR THE PHIL. OF Sci. 225, 226 (2002).
38Council Directive 1991/250, art 1.3, 1991 O.J. (L 122); Council Directive 1993/98,

art. 6, O.J. (L 290); Council Directive 1996/9, art. 3.1, 1996 (L 077) (providing,
respectively, for a definition of originality as "the author's own intellectual creation" for
computer programs, photographs and databases.) See also JAL Sterling, International
Codificationof Copyright Law: Possibilities,33 INT'L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. AND COPYRIGHT
L. 270, 287, (2000) (suggesting to "obtain a consensus that the 'author's own intellectual
creation criterion' will be adopted in this vision by the international copyright code").
39AL Durham, The Random Muse: Authorship and Indeterminacy, 44 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 569, 621 (2002).
40Id. at 573.
41 In the words of Hegel: "[a]ttainments, eruditions, talents and so forth, are,
of course,
owned by free mind and are something internal and not external to it, but even so, by
expressing them it may embody them in something external and alienate them." GEORG
WILHELM FRIEDR HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 41 (TM Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1967) (1821). Hegel, like Kant, concentrates upon the individual's will. He claimed that
"personality is the first, still wholly abstract, determination of the absolute and infinite will."
Id. at 40. For further analysis on Hegel's philosophy, see Peter Stillman, Property, in
PROPERTY, FREEDOM, AND INDIVIDUALITY IN HEGEL'S AND MARX'S POLITICAL THOUGHTS

Nomos XXII, 130 (J Pennock & J Chapman eds., 1980).
42 See generally Weisberg, supra note 33, at 69-89. Interestingly, Hume remarks that
"sucking is an action natural to man, and speech is artificial." DAVID HUME, A LETrER FROM
A GENTLEMAN TO HIS FRIEND IN EDINBURGH 31 (Ernest C. Mossner & John V. Price eds.,
Edinburgh Univ. Press 1967) (1745).
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human personality that are of interest to us include: ability, style, novelty,
flexibility of mind, willingness to consider unusual possibilities, ability to
attack greater or more difficult problems, dedication to a quest for ultimate
meanings,4 3 and other related elements. 4 Gregory Feist's meta-analysis
finds creative people to be more "autonomous, introverted, open to new
experiences, norm-doubting, self-confident, self-accepting, driven,
ambitious, dominant, hostile and impulsive. 'A5 Robert Sternberg argues for
a good deal of toleration of ambiguity is an asset of the creative
personality. 6 The actualization of these elements depends on the ways in
which the self then develops and becomes an integral part of one's body. In
47
other words, creative individuals possess a unique set of characteristics.
The Thomas Buss and Richard Mansfield study, for example, found that
scientists possess a stronger sense of the aesthetic, as they prefer
asymmetrical and complex works.4a
Hans Eysenck also found that
preference for complexity over simplicity characterizes the creative
achiever.4 9 Again, regardless how creative one's personality is, the creative
personality is a social construction. Copyrighted creative works represent,
as Justice Holmes in Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing
Co. remarks,
50
"the personal reaction of an individual upon nature."
Second, intelligence is used in different ways by people to build up a
storehouse of concepts, skills and faculties, and to interpret and cope with
the world. Measuring intelligence was never an easy task. Heredity and
environment have a close, interactive influence on human intelligence and
43 FRANK X. BARRON, CREATIVITY AND PERSONAL FREEDOM 249 (1968). Gergen
argues that meaning is a social construct. He does not object the idea that a person can have
his own meaning of certain words and events but viewing meaning as a pure individualistic
trait presents a riddle: if "ultimate meanings" are private, how can we ever know what others
mean? Gergen finds the answer in that meanings, whether 'ultimate' or not, emerge from
social practice and hence are socially constructed. Kenneth J. Gergen, Meaning in
Relationship, in SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION: A READER, supra note 11, at 148-155 (2003). If we

could not understand the meaning in others actions, how could we interact in society? How
could we reach the social structure according to which we live today?
44 Personality traits were found to be a decisive factor for the assessment of creativity.
See Wolfradt & Pretz, supra note 34.
45 Gregory J. Feist, A Meta-Analysis of Personality in Scientific and Artistic
Creativity,2 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 290, 299 (1998).

46 Robert J. Steinberg, A Three-Facet Model of Creativity, in THE NATURE OF
CREATIVITY: CONTEMPORARY PSYCOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 125, 143 (Robert J. Sternberg

ed., 1988).
47 Thomas V. Busse & Richard S. Mansfield, The Blooming of Creative Scientists:
Early,Late and Otherwise, 25 GIFTED CHILD Q. 63, 63-66 (1981).
48 See also RICHARD S. MANSFIELD & THOMAS V. BUSSE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
CREATIVITY AND DISCOVERY: SCIENTISTS AND THEIR WORK (1981).
49 Hans J. Eysenck, Creativityand Personality:Suggestionsfor a Theory, 4 PSYCHOL.
INQUIRY 147 (1993).
50 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
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neither can be treated in isolation. Further, intelligence is considered an
innate principle. It holds the key to the innate potential of the individual
which is perhaps the only exclusive - in James Harris's terminology "fullblooded" 51 - ownership per se that one can come to acquire. There is a
distinction between the innate form of intelligence and a developed form.
The innate form is what psychologists call "fluid intelligence, or the ability
to respond rapidly, to have quick reaction times .... This form is held to
have little to do with experience learning. The developed form is known as
"crystallized intelligence, 53 and is "more dependent on learning than on
innate skills ... depend more on reflection ... usually increase with time..
.554 This form makes one able to "use information available in the culture
for one's own ends." 55
Although the creative act is a social construction and intelligence and
personality are social phenomena, the individual creator, whether an author,
an artist or a composer, brings contribution from his innate constitution, his
private experiences and his special way to absorb these experiences and
manifest them in creative endeavors. The success of the creative process is
dependent on the success of the merger between internal and external
contributions. In this joint enterprise the individual contributes sufficient
substances that make his claim to a limited property right in his creative
expressions justified.
(2) Hebb's Two Definitions of Intelligence
Donald Hebb's two definitions of intelligence further explain the role
of the individual in the creative process. According to Hebb 56 Intelligence
A is the capacity for development a person has and is afully innateproperty
"that amounts to the possession of a good brain and a good neural
metabolism., 57 Intelligence B is "the functioning of a brain in which
development has already gone on.",58 The latter determines the average
level of performance or comprehension by the partly grown or mature
person., 59 In other words, while Intelligence A is innate and forms part of
the person's original constitution, the person owns it exclusively, but since
51 JAMES W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 29, 211, 228

(1996) (Harris dismisses

any view of such exclusive rights, inter alia when intellectual property is at stake).
52 Csikszentmihalyi, supra note 33, at 213.
53
id.
54id.
55
d. at 214.
56 Donald Hebb, A Textbook of Psychology, in INTELLIGENCE, CREATIVITY
AND COGNITIVE
STYLE 70 (George Shouksmith ed., 1970).
57
id.
58 id.

59 Id.
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the fruition of Intelligence B is a creature of social construction, ownership

of its products necessitates a different meaning. Combination of both forms
of intelligence is the only way to generate defensible creative expressions.
In copyright terms, the existence of ideas and their availability for
appropriation provides the author with the ability to appropriate, invest
labor, infuse elements from his personality, and eventually claim ownership
over the resource created. Hence the importance of both innate and
developmental factors on the individual's ability to create.
(3) Hebb and Locke on Intelligence andProperty
Interestingly, although John Locke did not explicitly address the
influence of the external environment in Chapter V 'Of Property' in the
Second Treatise of Government,60 a somewhat different interpretation of his
perception of one's property in the body and self can support my argument
and Hebb's definitions of intelligence. Locke argues that man has a
property in "lives, liberties and estates. 6 1 Locke also writes that "every
man has a property in his person. This nobody has any right to but
himself."62 Assuming that property in 'life' means property in body, in
limbs and - in Hebb's words - in "a good brain and a good neural

metabolism," the person is a separate entity. I propose that the 'person' is
not one's innate property, although the body and the limbs perhaps are.
This argument can be further supported by Locke's insistence on the role of
experience and social relations in the production and accumulation of
knowledge in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding,as well as his

conclusion that we are all "sociable creatures". 63 If this is correct then, it
can be said that Locke's assertion that a person's "labor of his body and the
work of his hands, we may say are properly his ...,64 and that by mixing

the labor with an object the person becomes the owner of a newly created
object mirrors Hebb's Intelligence B - the environment's social influences
on the creative ability. This argument can be summarized as follows:

60 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GovERNMENT 134-428

(Peter Laslett ed.,

Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988) (1689).
61 Id. at Book 2, § 123.
62
Id.at Book 2, § 26.
§ 1 (Peter
H. Nidditch ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1971) (1690). See also Lior Zemer, The Making of a
New Copyright Lockean, 29(3) Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y (2006) (forthcoming).
64Locke, supra note 60, at Book 2, § 26.
63 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING Book 3,
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Hebb andLocke on Intelligence andProperty
Degree of Property
Locke
Hebb
Intelligence A:
concerns innate
potential which are
stored in the mind and
in the neural system

Property in "life,
health, liberty or
possessions ' 65 or,
and
"lives, liberties
' 66
estates

Potentially Exclusive

Intelligence B:
concerns acquired!
developmental abilities

Property in an object
mixed with labor (eg,
intellectual properties)

Locke argues for
exclusive ownership.
This article advocates
a limited property
right for authors on
the basis that
copyrighted entities
are socially
constructed and
depend on social
relations and social
contributions from
external resources

- the functioning of a

mind after
development

The evolution of personality and intelligence shows that the creative
impulse operates on already-existing elements and past experiences. It is
true that creative thinking begins with what is already known. At the same
time, however, the creative act involves subjective contribution consisting
of innate potential, infusion of personality, objective, ahistorical, socially
neutral, external and universal elements. In that respect, Peter Drahos
writes that "[a]uthors, composers, musicians and scientists move in
traditions and cultures which they react to or against, 67 but:
Equally a story about creativity which sees it as an outcome of tradition
or other social forces ignores the capacity of individuals to step outside
of social norms. Creative individuals are in one respect rule breakers.
They develop ways of looking at the world that have no immediately
recognizable fit with the pre-existing norms or ways of thinking in a
given area. A better way of thinking about creativity is to say that it
involves individuals in dual and contrary roles. When the act of
65

Id.at Book 2, § 6.
Id.at Book 2, § 123.
67
PETER DRAHOS,A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 61 (1996).
66
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creation is complete, the individual steps forward to claim the role of
inventor, pioneer, innovator, genius and so on. Yet the link between
tradition and creativity suggests that, in the creative process,
individuals play out another role, that of the borrower and the copier.
When intellectual property rights are claimed, right holders often lose
sight of the duality of roles they have occupied, preferring to think of
themselves exclusively in terms of68creator and demanding protection
against other borrowers and copiers.
That is the nub. Assemblage of what is already known and the
subjective contribution of the individual creator is what usually takes
creators beyond what is already known, and what secures for them a
proportional right to own the works they produce.69

68

1 d. At 62.

69

An author, in other words, is a borrower. He borrows from the public and invests

the borrowed elements in a personal object. Wicklund analyzes the causal way in which
individuals can be said to borrow ideas from a group, absorb them and eventually
appropriate them. The group functions as the source. The group provides the potential author
with the moral principles, values or creative thoughts - the raw materials for translating
ideas into actual manifestations of one's personality. The product cannot be said to exist due
to direct group instructions, "but rather, a product of a person's actively borrowing and
finally 'plagiarizing' the group's ideas." Robert A. Wicklund, The Appropriation of Ideas, in
PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP INFLUENCE 393, 418-419 (Paul R. Paulus ed., 2nd ed. 1989).
An illuminating example that shows the importance of collaboration between the
individual and the public and how building on predecessors is crucial for the realization of
the creative act, is the identification of the double-helical structure of DNA. It also shows
that the sociality of knowledge is not confined to non-science fields. The level of creativity
and the dominant role of social interaction in the discovery of the structure of the DNA will
prove that sociality is a key player also in the area of scientific discoveries protected under
intellectual property laws. James Watson and Francis Crick were not working in a vacuum neither intellectual nor social. See generally JAMES WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX (1968).

The final discovery of the double-helix was highly collaborative. True, no
ethnographer was taking photos and recording conversations between James and Francis in
the Cavendish Laboratory, they both attested that absent of the interaction between them, the
discovery would not have been made. More importantly, during the 1950s it was believed
that DNA was the hereditary material and hence crucial to science. There were many
complexities on the way to discovering the double-helix, such as the possibility of three or
four strands. Collaborative research and discussions were the ultimate way in order to solve
these complexities. Apart from the scientific collaboration, Watson has described the
competitive context in which he felt himself to be working. The competitive feeling was
mainly based on the fact that the variety of proposals on the structure of the DNA that "were
being floated in the late 1940s and 1950s constituted part of the intellectual context in which
he and Crick conducted their exchanges." Longino, supra note 8, at 194. Watson and Crick
were also dependent on a half century of, inter alia, cytology, genetics and biochemistry
discoveries and experiments. Id. The discovery, however, would have gone unnoticed had
the larger scientific community not been ready for it, were DNA not already thought to be
the molecule carrying genetic information. The process of discovering the double-helix,
then, shows that there was a social need and social collaboration between the scientists and
between them and the general public, which was aware of the contribution in finding the
structure and functions of the DNA. In short then "the work of producing a structural
description of the DNA molecule was social, both collaborative and competitive." Id.
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V.
AUTHORIAL CREATIVE CAPACITY: CONSERVATISM VERSUS
REALISM
(1) Finke's FourDimensions of Creativity
Developed by Ronald Finke, creative realism is an approach to
creativity yet to be discussed in the context of copyright. It is an approach
that has much to offer contemporary debates on copyright and authorship.
In his research on the explicability of creativity, Finke argues that creativity
should be defined in two distinct ways: creativity that goes nowhere and
creativity that makes a change, creativity that goes beyond existing
knowledge. 70 Finke uses four dimensions in his theory: creative realism,
creative conservatism, creative idealism, and conservative idealism. First,
creative realism concerns the interplay between creative ideas and realistic
substance, a combination between creative originality and practicality.
This, he argues, defines continuity between old and new ideas: "In order to
be realistic, creative ideas need to be structured, and that structure needs to
have evolved from previously established ideas and principles.'
Taking
Picasso's Guernica as an example, Finke writes that "[e]ven when a new
idea consists of extensive transformations of previous ideas, one should still
be able to discover a connective path that links the structures. ' ' 72 Another
major theme in the first dimension is imaginative divergence which relates
to inspirational qualities that trigger the imagination. Guilford's research
supports this assumption. He found that imaginative divergence is crucial
to promote divergent thinking and a key feature in the creative process.73
The second dimension, conservative realism, deals with ideas
generated in traditional fields such as engineering, medicine and law.
Those who adhere to this dimension "wish to avoid ambiguity or
uncertainty." 74 The third dimension, creative idealism encompasses
fanciful original ideas such as extreme forms of artistic expression. Finke's
fourth dimension is conservative idealism which relates to ideas that
represent low imaginative divergence, lack of innovative thinking and mere
embracement of traditional ideas.
70Ronald A. Finke, Creative Realism, in THE CREATIVE COGNITIVE APPROACH 303326 (Steven M. Smith et al. eds., 1995). In an earlier attempt, Ulric Neisser introduced an
ecological approach to creative realism concentrating on the connection between cognitive
psychology and structures of the real world, rather than simple focus on the creative,
constructive abilities of the human mind. ULRIC NEISSER, COGNITION AND REALITY (1976).
71Finke, supra note 70, at 304.
72 Id.

73Id. at 305; see also Weisberg, supra note 33, at 60-61.
74Finke, supra note 70, at 305.
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There are many examples to creative realism: patentable inventions,
some scientific theories, art, music and films. Dada artists such as Arp,
Duchamp and Cubism are natural examples. In every musical composition
a "distinction can be made between new works that exhibit structural
connectedness to previous forms and excite the imagination and uninspired
•.. arbitrary combinations of notes and sounds. 75 For example, Mozart's
Symphonie nr.41, C-Dur, KV 551 'Jupiter' as opposed to a 'chance
composer' using Mozart's virtual dice game. Finke then remarks that
"some would argue, perhaps, that the latter are no valid as legitimate forms
of music that great classical work . . . but they fall into the category of

creative idealism, not creative realism., 76 Copyright law protects works
from all four dimensions and Finke's argument reminds us the generality of
our copyright system, the wide protection it secures for revolutionary as
well as mundane works. It also reminds us that the common conflict
between right holders and the limits imposed on ownership in copyright are
applicable to works that fall within any of the four dimensions of creativity.
The social nature of copyrighted enterprises is further supported by
Finke's three conditions for the assessment of creative realism: objective,
subjective and psychological. The objective condition generally relates to
the unavoidable connection between old and new. The subjective condition
deals with the effect an idea has on one's imagination and sense of
enlightenment, and the contribution of the person in the guise of new
insights - that the person can share it with the community. Furthermore,
Finke remarks that creative realism is sometimes confused with creative
idealism, which may lead to inability to reach creative realism. He gives as
an example the notions that one can levitate objects merely by
concentrating on them - to which he calls "overextension of imaginative
divergence" - or one's theory that lacks imaginative divergence because it
is based on computer simulations with no inspirational qualities.77 As
already mentioned, copyright law does not make any such distinction and
will grant protection to Uri Geller's bestseller and, with some
qualifications, computer-generated works.
Finke then concludes with two observations. First, the relationship
between creative realism and talent. Possession of talent will make one able
to produce "a new concept in art, a new style of musical composition, or a
new scientific theory," 78 while lack of talent "encourages conservative

realism and idealism., 79 Can we define copyright as the law of talent?
75
76

1d. at 310.
Id.

77Id. at
78

318-320.

Id. at 324.

79 Id.
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Copyright works embody their creator's talent but copyright law does not
require talent. It protects works in which talent is hardly visible. Second,
Finke tells us that "people have always been interested in trying to make
their dreams come true; in creative realism, they learn how to select the
The distinction between
dreams that are most worth pursuing." 80
copyrights and patents clarifies this point: while copyright law protects a
wider array of expressive dreams, patent law protects realistic expressive
dreams only - dreams that must not only be new and involve an inventivestep, but also capable of industrial applicability. In other words, overrealism does not mean less copyright. The theory of creative realism has an
inherent benefit in discussions on intellectual property as it draws the line
between patents (useful) and copyright (virtually every original creative
expression) endeavors. The former will not normally protect ideal or
conservative realism while the latter will not make a difference as long as it
is not a mere idea and involves the requisite mental efforts, modicum of
creativity, and appear in an expressive medium.
In his many studies on creativity, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi writes:
"Creative individuals alternate between imagination and fantasy at one end,
and a rooted sense of reality at the other. Both are needed to break away
from the present without losing touch with the past." 8' The combination of
fantasy and imagination, reality and sense, is a way to define creativity. It
joins together creative realism and creative idealism, without directly
excluding creative conservatism. We should favor this definition. Some
may agree with Finke's distinctions. However, I find it difficult to share his
strong belief that creative realism is the optimal formula. How do artists
and authors feel about this definition? Do they define their activity as
solitary genius or a combination of reality, fantasy, sense and imagination?
(2) BadArtists Copy; Good Artists Steal: Let the Artists Speak
Picasso, Shakespeare, Watt, Mozart, Watson and Crick, Braque, Arp
and Duchamp are all unique examples of the greatest artists and scientists
of our time that owe much to their consumption of external social and
cultural commodities. I do believe that they did go beyond what is already
known, but not in an illogic way. Just as Bach and Mozart could not hear
the "timber of the saxophone, or the pan-diatonic chordal arrangements of
Stravinsky ' 8 2 a modem musician could not "hear the sonorities of the
baroque trumpets ...

,'

But "the mnemonic methods by which these

80Id.

81Csikszentmihalyi, supra note 33, at 63.
82 Harold Shapero, The Musical Mind, 23 MOD. MusIc 31 (1946).
83 id.
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84
experiences are retained and later exploited creatively remain the same."
At the same time artists, composers and poets, all possess the great mastery
of artistic, musical or poetic phraseology.
Creative individuals have in themselves the ability to infuse subjective
artistic content. A poet was once defined as one which "[n]o subject is
alien to him, and the profounder his knowledge in any direction, the more

depth will there be to his poetry .... [H]e should be thoroughly grounded

in both the old and the new poetic forms" 85 and in order to go beyond he
must never respect tradition above his intuitive self A composer, for
example, "continues to work exercises in imitation of his models will be
surprised to finds that along with the thousand subtleties of technique he
will absorb from his masters, he will discover the personal materials of his
own art.''86 As Mozart tells us about himself in one of his letters
When I proceed to write down my ideas, I take out of the bag of my
memory.. .But why my productions take from my hand that particular
form and style that makes then Mozartish, and different from the works

of other composers, is probably owing to the same cause which renders
my nose so large or so aquiline, or, in short, makes it Mozart's, and
those of other people. For I really not study or aim at any
different from
87
originality.

There is a story about Picasso:
Picasso, who in his maturity was asked by an interviewer why he had
spent so much time... imitating the style of great masters of painting.

"If I had not imitated them"... [he] answered "I would have to spend
the rest of my life imitating myself."88 [In another interview he
remarks that] "at the beginning of each picture there is someone who
works with me. Towards the 89
end I have the impression of having

worked without a collaborator."
This reminds me a famous saying by the same Picasso: "bad artists
copy, good artists steal." This saying relates to copying not only from
artists in their individual capacity, but from cultures and collective entities
such as tribes. Rosemary Coombe, criticizing the rigid enclosures of
culture by contemporary intellectual property laws, writes that modernists
like Picasso, Brancusi and Miro "discover that primitive objects are in fact
84

85

1d.

Amy Lowell, The Process of Making Poetry, in

POETRY AND POETS, (1930),

reprinted in THE CREATIVE PROCESS 110, 112 (Brewster Ghiselin ed., Univ. of Cal. Press
1952).
86 Shapero, supra note 82, at 44.
87 EDwARD HOLMES, LIFE OF MOZART (1912), reprinted in THE CREATIVE PROCESS,

supra note
85, at 35, 35.
88
Csikszentmihalyi, supra note 33, at 421.
89 Christian Zervos, Conversation with Picasso, in CAHIERS D'ART (1935) (emphasis
added), reprintedin THE CREATIVE PROCESS, supra note 85, at 48, 50.
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powerful art and their own work is influenced by the power of these forms.
.. An identity of spirit and a similarity of creativity between the modem
and the tribal, the contemporary and the primitive, is celebrated.' 9'
All definitions on what creativity is share one common element: the
creative act is social. The knowledge we use and produce, expressions of
our personality and intelligence, are all social constructs and owe much to
the contribution coming from external social and cultural resources. This
does not mean that artists steal from other artists or that they plagiarize the
works of others. Artists create in a social context. This context requires
their recognition and the law's recognition of the decisive contributions that
the creative collectivity provides authors, artists and other creative
individuals.
The sociality of authorial knowledge dictates that
copyrightable expressions of art and authorship are not products of solitary
genius; they are jointly created by public and authors.
VI.
CONCLUSIONS
Picasso's unique openness to experience, whether of war atrocities or
artistic and cultural revolutions, made him a creative being and a divergent
thinker. 92 I have no doubt that Picasso went beyond the works of his
predecessors "but even he recognized that without mastering the best
achievements of a domain, one is left only with one's naked talents, having
to reinvent the wheel without tools. ' 93 The social nature of knowledge
absorption and knowledge production shows that naked talents are
insufficient. True, some insist that "creative ideas may be sparked by social
interaction but that the work required to produce and develop those ideas
into creative products is necessarily a solitary one."94 However, artists,
composers, poets and choreographers create in a social context. If they had
to produce and develop their creative ideas in isolation from our social and
cultural realities, the products of their creative labor would have never
reached authorial and artistic fruition.
There are many approaches to creativity that deny 'the genius artist,'
the artist that works alone, the artist that creates from thin air. In What is
91 ROSEMARY

J.

COOMBE,

THE CULTURAL

LIFE

OF INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY:

AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION AND THE LAW 217 (1998).
92 See generally Robert R. McCrae, Creativity, Divergent Thinking, and Openness to

Experience, 52 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1258 (1987) (discussing the principle of
openess to experience); see also Robert R. McCrae, Openness to Experience as a Basic
Dimension of Personality, 13 Imagination, Cognition & Personality 39 (1993-1994); but see
Colin Martindale & Audry Dailey, Creativity, Primary Process Cognition and Personality,
20 Personality and Individual Differences 409 (1996) (McCrae's research was criticized for
not finding a coherent connection between openess and divergent thinking).
93 Csikszentmihalyi, supra note 33, at 421-422.
94 Wolfradt & Pretz, supra note 34, at 306.

BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LA WJOURNAL

Vol 3:2

Art? John Canaday concludes that:
[T]here is a popular and absurd conception of the 'inspired' artist who
works in a kind of hypnotic frenzy. His creations gush forth from some
hidden reservoir of emotion without any effort on his part, although
sometimes with considerable physical agitation followed by dramatic
exhaustion. This simply does not happen. Or if it does
happen, what
95
gushes forth is formless and chaotic and hence not art.
The conclusion 'authorial knowledge is social' explains why when a
work is recognized as a work of art or authorship, traces of social relations
and collective cultural collaboration will always be found. It explains why
our copyright system should abandon the traditional romantic
understanding of the author as the dominant creative force and avoid
maintaining the myth of him being a 'lone genius.'

95 JOHN CANADAY, WHAT is ART? AN INTRODUCTION TO PAINTING, SCULPTURE AND

ARCHITECTURE 23 (1980).

